This paper introduces a mathematical framework for evaluating the relationship betweenplicies and mechanisms.~evaluationapproachcalled the assigmnent technique is defined. This technique consistsof establishing an assignment between the securityclassesof information established by policy constraints, and the protection domains, established by the properties of the mechanism. The assignmenttechniqueprovidesa theoretical foundation for assessing the sufficiency of an access controlmechanismwith respect to a well formed protection p21icy. Although this paper presents preliminary results of research, the propsed framework suggests a promising new approachfor evaluatingthe protection mechanisms of existing and propsed systems.
INTRODUCTION
The suitability of a protection mechanism for any given securitypolicy is not alwaysapparent. This pper presentsa theoretical foundation for assessing the sufficiency of an accesscontrol mechanism as a means of enforcing a nondiecretionary securitypolicy. A teclmique,termed assignment,establishes a relationship between the information sensitivitiesof the systementities (partioned accordingto plicy constraints),and dcminancedomains (inherently established by a protectionmechanism). The assignmenttechnique provides a method for mechanismvalidation, since the resultsof the assignment can be evaluated b establish whether or not the constraints of thẽ licy are met.
The assignmenttectmique was develo@ as a means of identifying the limitations of well-forma accesscontrolmechanisms.The initial investigation examinedthe feasibility of using the M.Otics ri~mechanism[131 as a means of enforcing a hierarchical compromisepolicy. Cur basic National Securitypolicy [5] is a -11 knom example. It was established by assignment (as is show in this paper) that the lwdtics ringmechanism,of itself, cannot provide this security. Cn the other hand, it is show that the Fultics ring mechanism cbes enforcean im~rtant form of programintegrity policy. This program integrity mechanismcan be used to delimita mst privilegedset of programsknown U.S. Government worknotprotected byU.S.copyright. as the securitykernel [11] . The security kernel in turn providesa mechaniemsufficient to aforce other security,integrity or access control policies. Thus, with the security kernel teclmology, the ring mechanism is sufficient for enforcing ccmputer security. By using assignment, w have gaineda much betterunderstanding of the capabilities and limitations of a ring protection mechanism, and have introduced a tool for the assessment of other protection mechanisms.
THE PRINCIPLESOF ASSIGNMEilT --order to clearly present the assignment technicpewe begin with a discussionof the principles of accesscontrol. This is necessary because much of the informationpublished in this area appearsto be impreciseor even contradictoryin nature. Some of the terminology used in this paper may aleo a~ar to contradictother authors. These differences and distinctions are intentional and will be disc~sed in greaterdetail in an anticipated thesis [14] by Lt. Shirley. 'Ihispapr merely addresses the basic framevxxk which we choose for our discussion.
LatticeSecurityPolicies
A securitypolicy is based upon external laws, rules, regulations and othermandatesthat establish fiat accessto information is to be permitted. We chose as our universeof discoursethe lattice securitypoliciesas identified by Walters [15] ad later also describedby Eenning [3] .'lhese universallyboundedlatticestructures consistof finite, partiallyorderedsets of accessclasses,each having a least upper and greatestlower bound. This class of plicies encom~sses many (ifnot all) practical~licies. Such plicies are of primary interest to National Lkfense becawe all mmdiscretionary securitypoliciescan be represented as a latticepolicy.To be effective,such &mlicies must clearlyestablishan accessclass for all system entities,i.e.,subjects(theactiveentities) and obj=ts (the pssive entities that may be referenced by a subject). Furthermore,  the @icy  must identify  all  Wrmissible  access  relations  between  the  subjects  and objects  of various  equivalence classes. If a policy ware not able to meet these tw requirements, the enforcement of the plicy could not be evaluated.
Note that we distinguish betweenprocesses and subjects in this paper. This is necessarybecause of the ambiguitythat might resultwithoutthe distinct notionof a subjectas a process-domain pair [9, 121, Particular y when we present a formalized definition of a domain.
AccessRelations my specificplicy will distinguish one or more distinctaccess relationsbetweensubjectsand objects. These are typically mirrored in the "access mode" of the correspmding protection mechanism.
'IWO genericaccessmodes are sufficient for a general discussion of the principlesand plicies discussedin this paper. These are [7] "observe" (the ability to observeinformation) and "modify" (theabilityto modify information).Other primitive accessnmdes are generallyjust a finergranularityof observation and modification privileges.
The enforcement of a~licy is fundamentally limited by the systemgs granularity of access. FDliciesthat prescribedistinctions not recognized by the accesscontrolmahanisms must be enforced in an overly restrictive manner or ignored. Ebr example,a policyaddressinga concatenation access relationcannotbe preciselyenforcedon a system that does not recognizesome form of appendaccess mode.
'The granularity of accesscontrolwithina system is dependent upn the abilityto distinguish attributes of stijectsand objects and u~n the variety of accessmcdes available. The primitive accessmodes are associated with the designof the system, including the protection mechanisms, and designatethe associated rights obtaind by an accessrequest.
An accessrelationis a tuple ( subject,access mode, object).This tuple signifiesthat a relation betweenthe subjectand objectexist smh that the subject is permittedto accessthe objectwith all the privileges associated with the access mode. The problem of information securitymay generally be expressed as the problem of pxmitting the existenceof only those accessrelationsthat in no way violateany of the applicablesysteins plicies.
BasicNationalSecurityPolicyExample
The basic NationalSecuritypolicy is a simple lattice @icy.
The policy definesentitiesas membersof one of four hierarchical access classes (UEKIX5SIFISD,CONFIDENTIAL,SECRET,TOP SECRET Recall that a systemis "secure"if there are no access relations that violateany applicable plicy. 'he SimpleSecurityCondition [1] states that if observe access is permitted, then the accessclass of the subject is greater than or equal to the accessclass of the object. The "ConfinementPro~rty" -historicallyknown by the less descriptive name of * -Property[1] --states that if modify access is~rmitted, then the access class of the subjectis less than or equal to the accessclass of the object. We can see that AccessDomains SC far, we have concentrated on the pro~rties of plicies. We now examinethe properties-of the protection mechanismsused to enforcesecuritypolicies. The principlenotionwe use is that of an accessdomain.
M accessdomain A, is a tuplel ( al, a2, . . . . ai, . . . . an ), where n is the numberof primitive accessmodes in the system,and ai is the set of all objects, { 01, 02, .../ Oj/ ....~} tiich a process exacutmg in domain A may access by access mode "i".
we speakof an (access mode)-dcnnain as the set of obj~ts which a process executing in that domain has the right to access according to that particular access mode.
Consider the following two domains: and C. The modify-domain PIA2 is empty.
A set of dominance domains are implicitly established by the system'sprotectionmechanisms. 'l'he dominancedomainsare not associated with any particularization of processesand objscts, but rather dominateall the domainsthat may occur in the system. Ecminancedomainsmay be uniquely labeled for convenience e. DI the Multicssystem,for example, the dominance domains established by the ring mechanism ware knownas rings and were labeledby ring numbers. Schroeder's protection mechanism also uses nunbersas labelsfor dominancedomains [12] .
we say thatA1 dominates(x ) A2 iff for each ail aA2 c aA .
"1+
'Ihe systemsprotection mechanismthen, establlses a set of dominance domains which we can use for validationof protection mechanisms. Secausethese domains dominate all other domains that may occur in the system, if w can show that our @icy holds for these dcmains, w have ahownthat it holds for the system.
im this paper,we chose to consideronly protection mechanisms which establisha universally boundedlatticeof dominancedomains. Such mechanisms representan interesting subsetof protection mechanismsand providesimplicityin this discussion.
The AssignmentTechnique -Assignmentis the establishment of a relationship between two entities such that the first entity is "assigned to" the second entity. Mathematically, the term assignmentisnot significant. me could easilyhave said that entity 1 is relatedto entity2. Intuitively, howwer, assignment is associatedwith the connotation "b fix a&horitatively" which precisely signifies our notionof this process.
Assignmentmay be denotedby a gra~from the firstentityto the secondas follows:
"is assignedto" --Xsignnent does not alter Ratherr a relationshipbetween established hhich can be expressed either entity. the entitiesis in the form of a tuple as follows:
Regardless of the means of representation,assignment is merely the act of associating an entityor set of entitieswith some other entity or set of entities.
lhe essence of the assignment technique is relatively simple. First of all, considerthe natureof a latticesecurity~licy. Such a policy partitions the objectsof a systeminto a lattice of equivalence classes.Each equivalence class can be thoughtof as an entitysubjectto assignment.
'Ihen considera mechanism, which establishes a lattice of dominance domains. Each of these domainscan also be thoughtof as an entitysubject to assignment.
Sincean assignment can be established between any twa entities,we can make an assignment between the equivalence classesestablished by a lattice security policyand the dominancedomainsthat are established by some protection mechanism. We then validate that (forthis assignment) the mecknisn is sufficientto supportthat plicy. 'l'his determination is made by examiningthe set of access relationsthat the mechanismpermits, and tasting for pssible violationsof the~licy.
we are now readyto illustrate howwe may use this assignment technique to evaluateprotection mechanismsused in the design of secure computer systems.
APPLICATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT -
The mefulness of the assignment technique appears to be rather far reaching in scope. Research currently underway is investigatinga numberof possibilities.'l'his paper addressesonly a few of the possible applications. The authors wholeheartedlyinvite the readerto suggestareas of furtherresearch. Additionally, -ents, opinions, and researchfindingsrelatedto the assignment technicpeare solicited.
Multics~MechanismAssignments
The questionof the sufficiency of the Itultics Ring Mechan iem for enforcement of the basic NationalSecuritypolicywas the initial problem that prompted the currentresearch effort and lad to the formulation of the assignment techni~e. It is appropriate then, that this paper present this analysis as an introductory a@ication of simple assignment.
CompromisePolicy. AS stated previowly in this paper, the basic NationalSecuritypolicy is a simplelatticesecurity plicy. \ -Now w must examinethe access relations permitted by the mechanisnand test for possibleviolationsof the policy. w order to do so, we must examine the nature of the iwlticsRing Mechanism more closely.
'he Eultics Ring Mechanism determines the authorized access of a process by means of the currentring number (r). Thus a process which is executingin ring number 1 would need to be cleared for at least SECRETinformation according to our assicjnmentheme.
The NulticsR.@ Mechanismdiscriminatesamong objects by means of a ring bracket. The ring bracketis a 3 -tuple ( Rl, R2, R3) Mere Rl, R2 and R3 are ring nunbersand Rl&R2 &R3. Access to objectsis restricted such that the currentring of execution must be less than or equal to R2 to observeinformation and less than or equal to R1 to modify information. Figure3 showscharacteristics of the ring bracketsboth in terms of the access mcdes used in this paperand the accessmodes used in Fultics. "s&f-G
Figure4
We now attemptto assignring brackets to an objectclassifiedSECRET. A problemoccurs immediately. We want processesexecutingin ring 2 to be able to observeour SFCRETobjects,but then a process in ring O, that is UNCLASSIFIED, will also be able to observe our object. The SimpleSecurity Conditioncannotbe enforcedwith this assignment so the assignmentschemeis not feasible.
Sinceneitherof these assignments are acceptable, and shiftingthe ring assignments numerically wuld yield similarresults,we can see that no assignmentwill be acceptable. Therefore,the IOJltics Ring Mechanismis not sufficient to enforce the basic NationalSecuritypolicyfor compromise.
The basic NationalIntegritypolicy [2] is the dual of the basic National Security policy. hhereasthe securitypolicy is concerned with the unauthorized observation of infom~ation or compromise, the integrityplicy is concerned with the unauthorized modification of information or subversion. The assignmenttechniqueshowsus that the MulticsRing Mechanismis not sufficient to enforce this dual~licy either.
The PUlticsRing Iwchanismis not sufficient to enforce the basic NationalSecurityFOlicy mr the basic NationalIntegritypolicy. tbwever, a I@l-tics SecurityKernelhas been designed [13] that is sufficient to supportboth of these @ icies. This may seem to be a contradiction, but it is not. The confusionis dissipatedwhen one asks the question, "What form of policydoes the FWlticsRing I@chan-ism supper t?" E2?.92BIn-rity Policy.
The mtion of a program integrity policy stems from the desire to prohibit modification of executable programs by less trustworthy subjects.
In the general sense, we wish to ensurethatour more sensitiveprogramsare "tampxprcof." Unlike a strict integrity@icy, however,programintegrityis not concerned with the issue of generalrimervation of information. Rather,programintegritydeals only with execution and modification. In this case, wa refinethe accessmcde "observe" to that of "read/execute" accessmode, taken in the sense of the generalvernacular.
A programintegritypolicy must consider tw issues. E'irst, each entitywithinthe systemmust have a programintegrityaccess cl&s, designated PI, aesignd to it. Second,the orderingof program integrity accessclassesm~t be fixedaccording to the constraints of the policymaker. Gnce these issuesare resolved,we maygu3ranWe that mI direct threat is~ssible by enforcement of the followingcondition:
SimpleProgramIntegrityCondition: If a sublect has "mcdify" accessto an obiect,then the program int=grity of the .s&ject is greaterthan or equal to the programintegrity of the object.
Becauseprogram integrity policies are concernedwith the executionissue,indirectmodificationof information is not strictly prohibited. This~ovides a certaindegreeof flexibility but also prcducesa certainmount of risk [8] . COnfinement of executionhelps to reducethe riskof such an indirectthreat.'lhe indirectthreatcccurs when a subject executes a programthat has been modifiedby amther less trustworthy subject. We can furthersee the usefulness of confinementin a program integrity policyby notingthat this property supports the use of libraryfunction. h a manner directlyanalogousto that for the National Integrity policy [2], we define the confinement propertyfor programintegrity as follows:
ProgramIntegrityConfinementProperty:Ifa subj~t has executeaccessto an objectthen the programintegrity of the objactis greater than or equal to the programintegrity of the subject.
The characteristicsof an example program integrity plicy in termsof accessmodes is shown in Figure5. Swh a policy is inherently a lattice policy. Considermwa specificprogramintegrity policy. *cording to this policy,entitiesare~rti-tionedinto one of four access classes designated as User,Supervisor,Utilityor Kernel. 'Ihe sensitivityof these accessclassesis s~ified as : Kernel> Supervisor> Utility> User. We then consider an assignmentto a IILticsring structure as shown in Figure6 
Figure6
Recallingthe characteristicsofring brackets shown in Figure 3 , we designate"Max"as Ring O, the programintegrityaccessclass "PI" as R1 and llMinll as R2. We note that' for this policyany choice for R2 greaterthan or equal to R1 will do. A mOre sophisticatedlicy requiringthe notionof a "gate" is beyond the scow of this pa~r.
We now examinethe access relations permitted by the mechaniamand teat for pxsible violations of the policy. From this examination, we cm see that the read-domains, the modify-domains and the execute-domains for each ring (RingO thru Ring 3) psrmit all valid access relationsto occur, and prohibitthe occurrenceof any invalidaccessrelation with respect to this plicy. So for this assignmcrk, no violationsare possible. Therefore, we have shown that the~ltics Ring Mechanismis sufficient to supportthis Program Ihtegrity policy. Had the assignmenttechniquekeen available to the authorsof the above statanent, they would have been affordeda means of expressing their vie= more precisely than the ambigmus phrase "inherently wrong".The assignment technique provides a praise means for clearlyformulating such an observation and evaluating its validity. AS shom , and in agreementwith Wlf's statement,the MulticsRing Mechanismis "inherently JW!Q' with respect to compromise@icies. CM the other hand, the~ltics Ring MechanisMiS j~t "I&!!K" C= a means of enforcing a programintegritypolicyor assistingin the enforcement of the system's nonhierarchical securitypolicies(viz.,via Security Kernels).
Other~Mechanisms
The Mdtics Ring Mechanismis by no means the only form of Ring Mechanism. 6y alteringthe requirements of the Ring Bracketsand the need for a Gate Keeper, one can contemplate05aptingthe ring mechanismsto meet other simple hierarchical policies.
Considerusing the assignmentshown in Figure  2 , but alteringthe means of discrimination among objectssuch that the Ring Bracketis a singleton (Rl) To be sure,thesebrief sqgestions do rot completelycharacterize a practicalprotection mechsnism. Hxever, it a~ars that ringmechanisms are adaptable for the enforcement of varioussimple hierarchical plicies.
CapabilityMechanisms
Considerable effort is currently underway to provide Provably Secure Cperating Systemsbased upon the cawbility mechanism[6,101. It is imFortant to examinev.hat form of protection capabilities actuallyprovide.
Capability mechanismsprimarily establish tw dominance domainswhich are enforcedby the system hardware. me domainconsistsof capabilities, and the other is objectsthat are not capabilities such as segmentsand directories. A process takes rm note of these dominancedomains,however,because all processeshave accessto capabilitiesas well as other types ofobjscts. So with respectto a process, the capability mechanism provides no inherent partitioningof the systementitiesat all. In fact, in tryingto determinethe structure of dominancedomainsfor non-capability objects,we encountera veritable"spagketti bowl" of domains, devoid of any inherent,unifyingstructure. 'Ihus a capability mechanismis of itself not sufficient for the enforcementofany non-discretionary policy.
'his is not to say that a capability mechanism is net Weful. For example,the mechanisncan protect a securitykernel in mwh the =me way as ringsprotectthe kernelin the Multicsdesign.
CONCLUSIONS
Assignmenthas been shownto be a useful techni~e in evaluating the sufficiency of a mechanism to enforcea securityplicy. This techni~e is based upon a formalized notionof domainsand the latticenatureof securitypolicies.
'lhis method providesconsiderable insight into the nature of access control. Characterizing a subj=t as a process-domain pair,we observe that non-discretionary protectionis dependentonly upon the dominancedomainsestablished by the systems mechanisms and the accessrelations betweenthese domains. The nature of the compkation is irrelevant. Furthermore, one can observethat any protection~licy can only be implemented on a computer system whichhas some form of system isolation prohibiting the users from altering the system'sisolationmethod.
'his pa~r presentsan introduction to assignment, and several simple examples have been investigated.
Considerable
research effort is still necessary.
of particular interest is the use of the assignment techni~e as a guide in the constructionof new mechanismsto meet classesof policiesof broad interest. Assignment research has alreadyprovidd considerable insightto the nature of securityenforcement, providinga means of formally~esenting the characteristics of mechanisms and plicies. Mechanisms can be categorized by the typs of enforcement that they providethus giving the system's designer a tcel for selection of mechanisms to meet the securityobjectivesof the system in question.
